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The reform of South African public procurement law has been on the cards for many years. 
Following years of promises from government leaders and officials about a new procurement 
law, a draft Public Procurement Bill for South Africa was eventually published for public 
comment in February 2020. The draft Bill proposes a complete overhaul of South African 
procurement law by consolidating existing procurement rules into a single statutory regime. It 
creates new institutional structures and a new dispute resolution process. There are, however, 
a number of problems with the draft Bill that should be addressed before the draft can proceed 
on its path to becoming a new overarching procurement statute in South Africa.  
 
This contribution introduces a special edition of the African Public Procurement Law Journal 
focusing on the draft Bill. In subsequent contributions, specific aspects of the draft Bill will be 
considered in more detail.  
http://applj.journals.ac.za 
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1 Introduction 
A new public procurement statute for South Africa has been on the cards for a number 
of years now. At least since 2013 the Minister of Finance has mooted major regulatory 
reform in public procurement. In its 2015 Public Sector Supply Chain Management 
Review, National Treasury stated that the Office of the Chief Procurement Officer 
(OCPO) was in the process of preparing a draft “Supply Chain Management Bill” and 
in his 2017 Budget Speech, the Minister of Finance stated that a  
“draft Public Procurement Bill will be published shortly. It will establish a single 
procurement authority and will consolidate the currently fragmented regulatory 
environment, in keeping with section 217 of the Constitution.”1  
This statement was repeated in the 2018 Budget Speech, with the Minister also 
indicating a timeframe for this development, when he stated:  
“The Public Procurement Bill will be submitted to Cabinet in March 2018 for gazetting 
for public comments.”2  
It was only two years later, in February 2020, that a draft Public Procurement Bill3 was 
published for public comment. 
The development of a new statutory instrument to govern public procurement in South 
Africa has thus been long in the making and is eagerly anticipated by the public 
procurement market and everyone involved in it. 
 
1 Gordhan 2017. 
2 Gigaba 2018. 
3 Hereafter referred to as “the Bill”.  
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In this brief contribution, which introduces this special edition focusing on the Bill, I will 
outline the drivers behind the procurement-law reform process in South Africa. In my 
view, these should serve as the main measures to judge the success of the Bill. I will 
subsequently raise a number of red flags in respect of the Bill. This will not be an 
exhaustive list of potential problems, nor will it provide any in-depth analyses of these 
issues or how to resolve them. Most of these issues will be addressed in more detail 
in the other contributions to this special edition.  
2 The drivers of procurement-law reform in South Africa  
There are numerous drivers of the reform of public procurement law in South Africa. 
One of the most important is the current state of South African procurement law. 
Despite a provision in the Constitution4 capturing in concise terms the five main 
principles animating procurement law, namely fairness, equity, transparency, 
competition and cost-effectiveness, there is very little coherence below the 
Constitution in how procurement law is constituted. There are many different statutes 
that contain some rules on procurement. These include at least the following: 
1. Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act 5 of 2000 (“PPPFA”) 
2. Public Finance Management Act 1 of 1999 (“PFMA”) 
3. Local Government: Municipal Finance Management Act 56 of 2003 (“MFMA”) 
4. Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000  
5. Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment Act 53 of 2003  
6. State Tender Board Act 86 of 1968  
7. Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act 12 of 2004 (“Corruption 
Act”) 
8. Construction Industry Development Board Act 38 of 2000 (“CIDB Act”) 
9. National Land Transport Act 5 of 2009 
10. State Information Technology Agency Act 88 of 1998  
11. Armaments Corporation of South Africa, Limited Act 51 of 2003 
12. Public Service Act 1994 
13. Public Administration Management Act 11 of 2014 
14. Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998 
15. National Supplies Procurement Act 89 of 1970 
 
4 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 s 217. 
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16. Financial Management of Parliament Act 10 of 2009 
17. Road Traffic Management Corporation Act 20 of 1999 
18. Administrative Adjudication of Road Traffic Offences Act 46 of 1998 
19. Nursing Act 33 of 2005 
20. Public Audit Act 25 of 2004 
21. Health Professions Act 56 of 1974 
22. Housing Act 107 of 1997 
23. Disaster Management Act 57 of 2002 
The scope of procurement rules contained in these distinct pieces of primary 
legislation differs significantly. It ranges from the entire PPPFA focusing exclusively 
on procurement to statutes that only contain a single section or two on procurement.  
Under these pieces of legislation there are dozens of pieces of subordinate legislation 
dealing with aspects of procurement in all shapes and sizes, ranging from traditional 
regulations to instruction notes to codes and standards – all with varying levels of 
statutory authority. 
There is significant overlap, duplication and even tension between all these various 
instruments. For example, currently there is serious regulatory tension in the context 
of infrastructure procurement between the Framework for Infrastructure Delivery and 
Procurement Management and its predecessor, the Standard for Infrastructure 
Procurement and Delivery Management, issued under the PFMA on the one hand and 
the construction procurement rules issued by the Construction Industry Development 
Board under the CIDB Act on the other hand. Another example of regulatory overlap 
is debarment in South African procurement law. There are two distinct debarment 
registers premised on completely separate regulatory bases. The Register for Tender 
Defaulters caters for debarment in terms of the Corruption Act. The Database for 
Restricted Suppliers caters for debarment under the PFMA/PPPFA. These two 
registers may, however, cover the exact same abuse of procurement processes.5 
While the Database for Restricted Suppliers captures debarment under both the PFMA 
and PPPFA, the procedures and exact reasons for restricting a supplier by means of 
 
5 See Williams & Quinot: 2007; Williams & Quinot: 2008. 
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listing on this database are not aligned under the two statutes, leading to significant 
uncertainty about the lawfulness of debarment decisions. 
In addition to the mass of overlapping statutory rules governing procurement, as the 
Constitutional Court stated in Allpay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd v 
Chief Executive Officer of the South African Social Security Agency,6 procurement law 
in South Africa is not statutorily consolidated or codified so that general administrative 
law, including the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (“PAJA”), and 
general contract law, including common law, as well as increasingly general 
constitutional law, especially after the Constitutional Court judgment in State 
Information Technology Agency SOC Limited v Gijima Holdings (Pty) Limited,7 apply 
to procurement disputes.  
There is thus a lot of law spread out over a large field that apply to public procurement 
in South Africa. In the face of this extreme level of fragmentation in the regulatory 
regime, one of the most important objectives of the procurement-law reform must thus 
be consolidation. 
The Bill explicitly acknowledges the aim of consolidation of the fragmented regulatory 
regime as one of the key drivers of this reform. Already in the Preamble, it states one 
of the objectives of the Bill as to “create single regulatory framework for public 
procurement to eliminate fragmented procurement prescripts”. This is repeated in the 
objects provision in section 2(e). The memorandum on objects of the Bill, published 
with the Bill, again echoes the aim of consolidation.  
There are also more substantive arguments driving the procurement law reform 
process. One of the main issues in this respect is the perception that the current 
approach to procurement as a tool for transformation is not delivering adequate 
results. There has been growing criticism of what is generally known as preferential 
procurement, referring to the use of public procurement to address the inequalities of 
the South African economy. The blame for a perceived lack of progress in transforming 
the economy has partially been placed on the PPPFA and its perceived rigidity in what 
 
6 2014 (1) SA 604 (CC). 
7 2018 (2) SA 23 (CC). 
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measures it allows.8 There is accordingly a need to revisit the preferential procurement 
regime. 
There has also been growing concern about the remedies regime in South African 
procurement law. Procurement has become a major area of litigation for the public 
administration,9 resulting in significant delays in delivering projects and fulfilling public 
functions. The remedies granted in some of these cases have had a further adverse 
impact on the functioning of the procurement system. A prime example is that of 
holding individual procurement officials liable in their private capacities for losses 
flowing from botched procurement processes.10 There can be little doubt that this 
remedy will have a chilling effect on procurement processes in that public officials will 
shy away from serving on tender committees and where they do from taking decisions 
or encourage overly cautious approaches. The existing procurement remedies regime 
is arguably unable to deliver effective relief in procurement disputes in a manner that 
can balance the need for integrity in the process with efficient acquisition.  
When evaluating the Bill, these are some of the main objectives against which the 
detailed provisions must be tested to determine whether the Bill proposes an improved 
procurement law regime in South Africa. 
3  A (non-exhaustive) list of red flags 
A number of concerns stand out for me in the Bill. This is not meant to be an exhaustive 
list of issues, nor do I intend to provide detailed analyses of any of these issues. They 
are, however, matters that deserve further deliberation in my view before this Bill can 
become the new South African procurement law. 
 
8 See Quinot 2019. 
9 Moseme Road Construction CC v King Civil Engineering Contractors (Pty) Ltd 2010 (4) SA 359 (SCA) para 1. 
10 Westwood Insurance Brokers (Pty) Ltd v Ethekwini Municipality and Others [2017] ZAKZDHC 15 (5 April 
2017). 
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3 1 Institutional arrangements 
One of the main changes that the Bill introduces into the South African public 
procurement system is the creation of the Public Procurement Regulator. This entity 
is granted overall regulatory powers in relation to public procurement across all levels 
of government. It is not a centralised procuring entity, that is, it is not a return to the 
erstwhile State Tender Board. The Regulator’s role under the Bill is largely to 
implement the Bill, ensure that the procurement system functions properly within the 
regulatory prescripts and act as a dispute resolution mechanism. It is granted 
extensive powers to create additional rules or prescripts under the Bill (I shall return 
to this issue below). 
The conceptualisation of the Regulator and its powers under the Bill deserve a full 
contribution on its own. In this brief introduction, I will only flag one aspects of the 
Regulator that I perceive to be problematic. That is the independence of the Regulator.  
The Regulator is created within National Treasury (section 4). In this sense the 
Regulator will largely replace the current Office of the Chief Procurement Officer. 
Section 4(2) obliges the Head of the Regulator to ensure that the Regulator exercises 
its mandate “impartially” and “without fear, favour or prejudice”. There are, however, 
no further mechanisms in the Bill that would effectively enable the Regulator to act in 
this independent manner. In fact, the Bill provides virtually no further guidance on the 
institutional functioning of the Regulator. For example, the Bill says nothing about the 
appointment or dismissal of the Head of Regulator or to whom this person is 
accountable. In the absence of any such provisions, one must assume that the 
Regulator will function as a unit of National Treasury alongside all other divisions and 
will thus be subject to the same oversight and control mechanisms within the 
Department.  
This institutional arrangement will hardly result in any form of independence for the 
Regulator. Simply put, the Regulator will not be independent from national 
government. In my view, this lack of independence will greatly undermine the potential 
effectiveness of the Regulator in fulfilling its oversight function. It will exist within the 
same departmental relationships as all other divisions of National Treasury, which 
means that it will not enjoy any particular enhanced standing to ensure that 
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procurement across all organs of state is aligned to a single regulatory vision. The 
cross-cutting role of procurement across different departmental mandates will be lost 
within this institutional arrangement. That is, the role that procurement plays in 
delivering on policy mandates across all government departments, either directly as in 
the industrial development or wealth redistribution roles of procurement in South Africa 
or indirectly, in facilitating public programmes such as infrastructure development or a 
national health insurance scheme, will not be optimally served by this institutional 
arrangement. With this arrangement, procurement remains wholly conceptualised as 
exclusively within the public finance domain to the detriment of these other important 
conceptualisations.  
The lack of effective independence will also put the dispute resolution function of the 
Regulator at risk. Without proper independence, it is questionable whether aggrieved 
suppliers will be satisfied with the orders issued by the Regulator when a matter is 
appealed to it. If suppliers regard the Regulator as too close to government, in effect 
as part of government, it is to be expected that they will still proceed to courts to resolve 
procurement disputes, which would undermine the purpose of the new dispute 
resolution mechanisms created in the Bill.  
3 2 Preferential procurement 
The complete repeal of the PPPFA comes as no surprise. As noted above, the reform 
of the preferential procurement regime is one of the main drivers of procurement law 
reform and it was thus always expected that a new law will involve significant changes 
to the existing PPPFA regime. Of particular concern, however, is what the PPPFA is 
replaced with. Even though it is called a chapter in the Bill (chapter 4), the Bill in fact 
contains only a single provision on preferential procurement (section 26). Moreover, 
this section does not really tell us much. As is the case with many aspects of the Bill, 
section 26 simply leaves it to the Minister to create a preferential procurement regime. 
In terms, section 26(1) states that  
“The Minister must prescribe a framework for preferential treatment for categories of 
preferences, and the protection or advancement of persons, or categories of persons, 
previously disadvantaged by unfair discrimination, in procurement.” 
Geo Quinot   (2020) 7 APPLJ 9 
In my view, this is problematic in light of section 217 of the Constitution. Section 217(2) 
explicitly allows for “categories of preference in the allocation of contracts” and “the 
protection or advancement” of persons previously discriminated against in the public 
procurement system. However, section 217(3) places a very important restriction on 
these measures by providing that “[n]ational legislation must prescribe a framework 
within which the policy referred to in subsection (2) must be implemented.” The 
Constitution is thus explicit that the framework for preferential procurement must by 
prescribed in national legislation. I have serious reservations about the constitutionality 
of simply delegating this power to create the framework to the Minister. In my view, 
the framework should be created in the legislation itself, as is currently the case under 
the PPPFA.  
3 3 E-Procurement 
The Bill explicitly states that it aims to “provide for procurement that uses technology 
to simplify procurement processes and better leverage economies of scale” (section 
2(b)(v)). In support of this aim it empowers the newly created Procurement Regulator 
to “promote the use of technology in procurement” (section 5(1)(k)) and the Minister 
to issue regulations regarding “the use of information and communications technology 
in procurement” (section 121(1)(g)). The Bill furthermore contains an explicit provision 
(section 15) stating that “Institutions must, to the extent possible, use information and 
communication technology to implement any of the procurement methods in this Act.” 
All of this suggests that the Bill is, at long last, forcing the South African public 
procurement system to embrace e-procurement at an increased pace than has 
hitherto been the case.11 However, I am not convinced that these nods in the direction 
of e-procurement are genuinely embedded within the Bill’s paradigm of procurement. 
There are many examples in the Bill where an outdated, manual and paper-based 
paradigm of procurement seeps through. For example, the Bill explicitly provides for 
the opening of bids in section 36. While the rules governing such opening may be read 
to include e-procurement, the formulation of the section clearly reflects a manual 
paradigm of procurement where bids “must be opened at the time and place indicated” 
(section 36(1)), “a bidder or his or her representative is authorised to attend the 
 
11 See Kramer 2016. 
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opening of bid session” (section 36(3)), the “name of the bidder, the total amount of 
each bid … must be read out” (section 36(4). Another, more puzzling example, is found 
in section 41. This section obliges an institution to “forward a written request to the 
Regulator to verify if a preferred bidder, or any of that bidder’s directors, members, 
trustees or partners, is listed on the register for bidders and suppliers debarred”. This 
manual approach is puzzling given that this exact same function is currently done by 
way of technological solutions in the form of the different lists of debarred suppliers 
that are published on the internet on National Treasury’s website and the central 
supplier database where this information is captured against the registration of all 
suppliers. 
In my view, the Bill is not doing enough to push the South African public procurement 
system into the 21st century by adopting a stronger e-procurement paradigm.  
3 4 Continued proliferation of laws 
As noted above, one of the key drivers of the current procurement law reform is the 
fragmentation of procurement law in South Africa. A major contributing factor to this 
fragmentation has been the issuing of dozens of subordinate pieces of legislation by 
especially National Treasury under the PFMA and PPPFA.  
I am concerned that the powers granted to the newly created Procurement Regulator 
to issue all kinds of binding instruments will simply continue this trend. The Regulator 
is given the power to “determine a model procurement policy” (section 5(2)(d)), to 
“issue a directive to declare certain procurement practices as undesirable” (section 
5(2)(f)) and to “issue binding instructions in accordance with this Act” (section 5(2)(g)). 
In addition, provincial treasuries are empowered to “issue provincial instructions on 
procurement” (section 9(2)(a)).  
On top of all these binding instruments that may be issued by the Regulator and 
provincial treasuries, the Minister is also granted extensive powers to create 
regulations (section 121). The Minister’s power to create regulations is highly 
circumscribed in terms of both the substantive issues to be covered and especially the 
procedures to be followed. In form, the regulation-making powers under the Bill are 
significantly more controlled than equivalent powers in other statutes. It is curious, 
however, that the powers of the Regulator and provincial treasuries to issue (also 
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binding) instruments under the Bill are not controlled in form at all. That is, there is no 
prescribed procedures to be followed when either of these entities issue further rules 
under the Bill. It is curious that the Minister would be subjected to extensive procedural 
control, but entities lower in the executive hierarchy would be left largely unchecked in 
terms of procedure. 
3 5  Silence on local government 
The Bill proposes to revoke the entire chapter 11 of the MFMA (section 123 read with 
the schedule). This means that the current provisions dealing with procurement at local 
government level will be wholly subsumed under the Bill. This is a very significant 
change since local government procurement has been governed completely 
separately from other levels of government to date. 
If one reads the Bill from a local government perspective, a number of red flags arise. 
In fact, it is not clear that local government was given much thought in many of the 
provisions in the Bill.  
The prime example is the dispute resolution mechanisms created in chapter 9. While 
detailed provision is made for provincial and national reconsideration of procurement 
decisions, the chapter is near silent on how disputes at local government level will be 
dealt with. It seems that municipalities will be obliged to reconsider their own 
procurement decisions upon application as is the case for all procuring entities at all 
levels of government (section 96). However, it is far from clear what should happen 
after that. Following reconsideration by the entity under section 96, section 97 provides 
for reconsideration by a provincial treasury of “a decision made by an institution in the 
provincial sphere of government” and section 98 provides for reconsideration by the 
Regulator of “a decision made by an institution in the national sphere of government”. 
There is no equivalent provision explicitly dealing with decisions made by an institution 
at the local sphere of government. Furthermore, access to the newly created Public 
Procurement Tribunal is only via decisions by provincial treasuries and the Regulator. 
In other words, one will only be able to take a decision on review to the Tribunal after 
you have approached a provincial treasury or the Regulator for reconsideration. The 
question emerges of where this leaves local government. Does this imply that the 
Tribunal will have no jurisdiction over local government procurement?  
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The Bill is in my view currently not adequately focused on local government 
procurement and requires careful reconsideration in this light.  
4 Conclusion 
The publication of the draft Public Procurement Bill, 2020, is definitely a welcome 
development in the reform of South African public procurement law. Such reform is 
long overdue and is urgent in light of the mountain of challenges facing public 
procurement in South Africa. If one bears in mind the massive role that public 
procurement plays in all aspects of public administration, this need for reform becomes 
even more urgent given the knock-on effect of poor procurement on government 
generally. This has been vividly brought home during the COVID-19 pandemic, when 
so many problems in dealing with the pandemic had something to do with 
procurement, like the struggle to reopen public schools because of failures in the 
procurement process of essential health and safety equipment necessary to ensure 
safety of learners and teachers. If one furthermore bears the massive scale of public 
procurement in mind, in South Africa government currently spends about a trillion rand 
on public procurement, which is 1.3 times what it spends on wages,12 the urgency is 
again increased. Even before the COVID-19 pandemic, the South African economy 
faced major challenges and government spending was under severe pressure. With 
the pandemic, this pressure has exponentially increased. It is thus also from a public 
finance and economic perspective imperative that the system be reformed to increase 
efficiencies and value for money in public spending. 
I hope that the publication of the Bill and the public engagement process following that 
publication will accelerate and deepen public debate around the South African public 
procurement system. In its current form, I do not think that the Bill presents us with the 
tool we need to meaningfully reform our procurement system, but I do think that it 
provides us with a good basis to start a robust conversation around what that ideal 
tool should eventually look like. This special edition of the African Public Procurement 
Law Journal is aimed at contributing to that debate.   
 
12 Brunette & Klaaren 2020.  
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